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CASE NOTES
AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS-THE ALRB
MAY NOT AUTOMATICALLY IMPOSE MAKE-WHOLE
RELIEF AGAINST AN EMPLOYER WHO COMMITS A
"TECHNICAL" REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN ORDER TO
OBTAIN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN ELECTION CERTI-
FICATION-J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Board, 26 Cal. 3d 1, 603 P.2d 1306, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1979).
J. R. Norton Company (Norton) filed a petition with the
Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB or Board) setting
forth seventeen objections which allegedly warranted setting
aside a union election held among Norton's employees. The
Board's executive secretary reviewed the objections and ac-
companying declarations and determined that, with respect to
fifteen objections, Norton had failed to establish a prima facie
case as required by the Board's administrative regulations.1
Accordingly, the executive secretary summarily dismissed the
fifteen objections and scheduled the remaining two for hear-
ing. Norton requested a review by the Board of the executive
secretary's decision,' and after examining the objections and
supporting declarations, the Board affirmed the action of the
executive secretary. A hearing was held on the two remaining
objections,' and the Board affirmed the decision of the inves-
tigative hearing examiner that those objections should also be
dismissed. The Board then certified the United Farm Workers
of America (UFW) as the exclusive collective bargaining rep-
resentative of Norton's employees.4
© 1981 by Mary Lynne Thaxter
1. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20365(c) (1979) states:
Where the objection alleges that the election was not conducted prop-
erly or that misconduct occurred affecting the results of the election...
the petition shall be accompanied by a declaration or declarations set-
ting forth facts which, if uncontroverted or unexplained, would consti-
tute sufficient grounds for the Board to refuse to certify the election.
2. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1980) and the applicable ALRB reg-
ulations, CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20393 (1979), provide for Board review of the
executive secretary's summary decisions.
3. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20370 (1979).
4. J.R. Norton Co., 3 A.L.R.B. No. 66, at 13 (May 23, 1977).
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Retaining "good faith" doubts as to the validity of the
election certification, Norton sought judicial review of the
Board's decision by deliberately refusing to bargain.' The
UFW filed an unfair labor practice charge. The ALRB found
Norton guilty of an unfair labor practice,6 and ordered it to
take affirmative action that included an order to make its em-
ployees whole for all losses of pay and other economic benefits
sustained as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain.?
Norton then filed a petition for writ of review' urging the
Court of Appeal to set aside the decision on two separate
grounds: First, that by summarily dismissing eight of its ob-
jections,' the Board denied the employer its right to a full evi-
dentiary hearing as provided for in Labor Code section
1156.3(c);10 and, second, that even if the validity of the elec-
tion certification were assumed, the Board abused its discre-
tion in applying the make-whole remedy. The petition was
summarily denied by the appellate court.
The California Supreme Court granted a hearing and is-
5. Under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA or Act), as with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the refusal to bargain by the employer, with the
expected filing of an unfair labor practice charge by a union, is the only procedure by
which an employer can obtain court review of a Board certification of a union. Only
after an employer is judged guilty of an unfair labor practice may it then appeal and
obtain court review of both the unfair labor practice and the Board's certification
decision. Such a course of action is referred to as a "technical" refusal to bargain.
See, e.g., Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, 66 Cal. App. 3d 781, 136 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1977); AFL v. Labor Board, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S.
473 (1964).
6. J.R. Norton Co., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 39, at 2 (June 22, 1978).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.3 (West Supp. 1980) provides that when the Board
finds an employer guilty of an unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain in good
faith, it may enter an order "requiring such person ... to take affirmative action,
including ... making employees whole, when the Board deems such relief appropri-
ate, for the loss of pay resulting from the employer's refusal to bargain." (emphasis
added).
8. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West Supp. 1980) provides in part:
Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or denying
in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain review of such order in
the court of appeal having jurisdiction ... by filing ... a written peti-
tion requesting that the order of the board be modified or set aside.
9. Norton apparently conceded that seven of its objections were properly re-
jected by summary dismissal.
10. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1156.3(c) (West Supp. 1980) states: "Within five days af-
ter an election, any person may file with the board a signed petition.. . objecting to
the conduct of the election. . . . Upon receipt of a petition . . . the board, upon due
notice, shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the election shall be certified."
(emphasis added).
NORTON v. ALRB
sued a decree setting aside and remanding to the Board the
make-whole portion of the order, and enforcing the remain-
der.1" The court held that the ALRB's regulation, which con-
ditions a full evidentiary hearing on the presentation of objec-
tions and factual declarations that establish a prima facie
case, is a reasonable exercise of the Board's rule-making au-
thority,12 and that under the applicable administrative regula-
tions, the executive secretary and the Board properly dis-
missed Norton's eight objections without a hearing. 8 The
court, however, held that the Board lacked authority to im-
pose the make-whole remedy in an unqualified fashion when
the employer has committed a "technical" refusal to bargain
for the sole purpose of obtaining judicial review." The court
instructed the Board, on remand, to look at the totality of the
employer's conduct to determine whether Norton had gone
through the motions of contesting the election results as a
mere pretense to avoid bargaining, or whether it litigated the
election certification based on a good faith belief that the al-
leged violations would have affected the outcome of the
election.' 5
The court first considered the propriety of the ALRB's
administrative regulations for challenging an election, and
held that such regulations, which condition a full evidentiary
hearing on the presentation of objections and factual declara-
tions establishing a prima facie case, are a reasonable exercise
of the Board's rulemaking authority to adopt "such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
the ALRA."' The Board is not required to hold a full hearing
in every case in which a party merely files a petition objecting
to the conduct of a representation election. The requirement
that an objecting party present a prima facie case eliminates
the necessity for a hearing on inconsequential, frivolous, or
dilatory issues,'7 which the court noted appears particularly
compelling in light of one of the policies underlying the
11. J.R. Norton Co. v. ALRB, 26 Cal. 3d 1, 40, 603 P.2d 1306, 1329, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 710, 733 (1979).
12. Id. at 17, 603 P.2d at 1314, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
13. Id. at 27, 603 P.2d at 1320, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
14. Id. at 29, 603 P.2d at 1322, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 726. See note 5 supra.
15. 26 Cal. 3d at 39, 603 P.2d at 1328, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1144 (West Supp. 1980).
17. Radovich v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 72 Cal. App. 3d 36, 45, 140
Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1977).
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ALRA. As the court explained, the need for a newly formed
labor organization to obtain legitimacy as quickly as practica-
ble is an important interest to be considered in evaluating ad-
ministrative regulations for determining the validity of an
election.'!
The court cited the standards utilized by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) as further support for sus-
taining the ALRB regulation."' The NLRB does not hold a
hearing on post-election objections unless the objecting party
offers prima facie evidence showing substantial and material
factual issues that would warrant setting aside the election.
The reason for the NLRB's requirement is the same as that
supporting the ALRB's regulation - to prevent dilatory ac-
tions by parties disappointed in the election returns.
Reasoning that both administrative and judicial processes
provide adequate safeguards to prevent abuses of the ALRB's
discretion to summarily dismiss objections to representation
elections,s0 the court concluded that "the regulation serves a
valid purpose in assuring that the ALRB will not dissipate its
limited resources in holding meaningless hearings on claims
that are, as a matter of law, insufficient."2'
18. 26 Cal. 3d at 15, 603 P.2d at 1312-13, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
The denial of recognition is an effective means of breaking up a strug-
gling young union too weak for a successful strike. After the enthusiasm
of organization and the high hopes of successful negotiations, it is a dev-
astating psychological blow to have the employer shut the office door in
the union's face. Imposing a legal duty to recognize the union would
prevent such anti-union tactics and thereby contribute to the growth of
strong labor organizations.
Id. (quoting Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1408
(1958)).
19. The California Legislature modeled the ALRA in large part after the com-
prehensive federal labor relations statutes, the NLRA, and the Taft-Hartley Act (29
U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-183, 185-187, 191-197, 557 (1976)). CAL. LAB. CODE §
1148 (West Supp. 1980) provides: "The board shall follow applicable precedents of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."
20. The executive secretary's dismissal is subject to review by the Board. CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20365(e)(h) (1979). This entails an examination of the appealing
party's arguments and evidentiary support in order to determine whether a prima
facie case has been stated. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20393(a) (1979). Although an
ALRB union certification is not normally subject to direct judicial review, a party
seeking to obtain such review may do so before the Court of Appeal after the Board
has found him guilty of an unfair labor practice. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1160.8 (West Supp.
1980). Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, 66 Cal. App. 3d 781, 788, 136 Cal. Rptr. 233,
237 (1977). See note 5 supra. See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1158 (West Supp. 1980).
21. 26 Cal. 3d at 18, 603 P.2d at 1315, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
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The court then examined whether the executive secretary
and the Board erred in concluding that the declarations ac-
companying eight of Norton's objections failed to set forth, as
required by the ALRB's administrative regulation, "facts
which, if uncontroverted or unexplained, would constitute suf-
ficient ground for the Board to refuse to certify the elec-
tion."' 1 After reviewing the declarations and evidence offered
by Norton in support of these objections, the court concluded
that Norton had failed to present evidence establishing a
prima facie case, and accordingly, the executive secretary and
the Board properly dismissed the eight objections without a
full investigative hearing."
Having sustained the Board's summary dismissal of Nor-
ton's objections, the court turned to Norton's contention that
even if the dismissals were proper, the imposition of the
make-whole remedy was beyond the Board's discretion where,
as Norton alleged, the refusal to bargain was merely a techni-
cal means of obtaining judicial review of the Board's election
22. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 20365(c) (1979).
23. Norton's eight objections related to alleged improper union activity and dis-
ruption in the vicinity of one of the polling areas, to "access rule" violations allegedly
committed by the union in the week preceding the election, and to misconduct by the
Board agent in changing one of the polling sites at a time when it was impossible to
inform the employees of the change.
The "polling area" objections were properly dismissed for Norton's failure to
produce evidence suggesting that the alleged improper union activity or disruption
had a potential for interfering with the employees' free choice. 26 Cal. 3d at 22, 603
P.2d at 1317, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 8, § 209000 (1980) provides that the rights of employees
under CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1980) include the right of access by union
organizers to the premises of an agricultural employer for the purpose of meeting and
talking with employees and soliciting their support. "Access rule" violations will not
constitute grounds for setting aside an election in the absence of proof that the "ex-
cess access" taken by the union was of such a character as to have had an intimidat-
ing impact on employees or in any other way affected the outcome of the election. See
K.K. Ito Farms, 2 A.L.R.B. No. 51 (Oct. 29, 1976); Dessert Seed Co., 2 A.L.R.B. No.
53 (Oct. 29, 1976); Bruce Church, Inc., 3 A.L.R.B. No. 90 (Dec. 13, 1977); Martori
Brothers Distributing, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 5 (Jan. 27, 1978). Norton's factual declarations
relating to the alleged access violations contained no suggestion that the union's vio-
lations were of an intimidating or coercive nature. 26 Cal. 3d at 26, 603 P.2d at 1320,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
A full investigative hearing was held on a separate, virtually identical "changed
polling site" objection, which raised the issue in terms of "whether the board agent
held the election at a time and place which prevented a substantial number of em-
ployees from voting." Because of the duplication of the two objections, the executive
secretary committed no prejudicial error in dismissing one objection while setting a
similar objection for hearing. Id.
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certification and was motivated by good faith doubts about
the validity of the election. The Board had applied a "blan-
ket" rule, announced in Perry Farms, Inc.,2 4 that required im-
position of the make-whole remedy in all cases in which an
employer is found to have refused to bargain.2
In Perry, the Board had justified the blanket rule by as-
serting that employees suffer the same loss - the deprivation
of collective bargaining rights and derivative economic bene-
fits - whether the employer's refusal to bargain is flagrant or
willful2 or is designed purely to procure judicial review of the
underlying election issues. The Board used the same logic,
which emphasizes the compensatory nature of the remedy, in
imposing make-whole relief on Norton. The court, however,
held that the Board lacks the authority to impose such relief
in a categorical fashion when the employer has been found
guilty of an unfair labor practice solely as a result of a techni-
cal refusal to bargain.2 7
The court observed that two competing considerations,
both of which are fundamental to ALRA policy, arise when-
ever a representation election is attacked. The first is the need
to discourage frivolous election challenges pursued by employ-
ers as a dilatory tactic designed to stifle self-organization by
employees. When used to that end, the court agreed that
make-whole relief is appropriate.2 8 The second consideration
is the important interest in fostering judicial review as a check
on arbitrary administrative action in cases in which the em-
ployer has raised a meritorious objection to an election but
the objection has been rejected by the Board.2 9 It is in serving
this interest that a rule automatically imposing make-whole
relief cannot be sustained. As the court observed, "such a rule
places burdensome restraints on those who legitimately seek
24. Perry Farms, Inc., 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, rev'd on other grounds, 86 Cal. App.
3d 448, 150 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978); see also Adam Dairy, 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24 (Apr. 26,
1978).
25. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 25, at 9.
26. Id. at 10.
27. 26 Cal. 3d at 29, 603 P.2d at 1322, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
28. The make-whole remedy "compensates employees for losses incurred during
the period when collective bargaining does not take place as a result of litigation
attacking the propriety of a representation election; it thereby reduces the employer's
financial incentive for refusing to bargain in order to avoid the expenses he would be
required to pay if he had entered into a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 31,
603 P.2d at 1323, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
29. Id. at 30, 603 P.2d at 1322, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
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judicial resolution of close cases in which a potentially merito-
rious claim could be made that the NLRB or ALRB abused
its discretion."30
Under the ALRA, employees are not only given the right
to elect representatives of their own choosing, but are guaran-
teed the right "to refrain from any or all of such activities
. .." as well."1 The court quoted observations of one commen-
tator that the make-whole remedy
place[s] greater restrictions on judicial review in general,
and therefore will reduce the number of appeal-worthy
refusal-to-bargain cases heard by the courts.... Since in
many cases the employer might have won on appeal, the
deterrence of good-faith review might interfere with the
employees' right not to be represented by a union .... 81
The court further observed that the make-whole remedy is
"especially harmful to small employers, who. . . have neither
the resources nor reserves to risk review of a representation
decision if the [make-whole] remedy might be imposed upon
them if they 'guessed wrong' and lost." s33 In the court's opin-
ion, the Board had failed to acknowledge this serious deter-
rent impact when it announced its blanket rule in Perry and
when it applied the rule to Norton.
The ALRB unsuccessfully argued that because the make-
whole remedy is compensatory in nature," a rule of blanket
imposition should be sustained because it ensures that em-
30. Id. at 32, 603 P.2d at 1324, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 728. The court went on to say
that
the need to avoid placing undue restraints on judicial review in the con-
text of proceedings concerning representation elections must be recog-
nized as especially compelling when one considers that the NLRA and
ALRA purpose is not exclusively to promote collective bargaining, but
to promote such bargaining by the employees' freely chosen representa-
tives. The imposition of make-whole relief undermines this purpose to
the extent that it discourages employers from exercising their right to
judicial review in cases in which the NLRB or ALRB has rejected their
meritorious challenges to the integrity of an election.
Id. at 34, 603 P.2d at 1325, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (emphasis in original).
31. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1980).
32.. 26 Cal. 3d at 34-35, 603 P.2d at 1325-26, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (quoting
Comment, Employee Reimbursement for an Employer's Refusal to Bargain: The Ex-
CeL-O Doctrine, 46 TEx. L. Rav. 758, 774 (1968)).
33. 26 Cal. 3d at 35, 603 P.2d at 1326, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (quoting McGui-
ness, Is the Award of Damages for Refusals to Bargain Consistent with National
Labor Policy?, 14 WAVE L. Rav. 1086, 1102 n.89 (1968)).
34. See note 28 supra.
1981]
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ployees will be compensated for their losses when an em-
ployer's objections to an election ultimately do not prove to be
meritorious. The court simply reiterated its position and said
that blanket imposition unduly emphasizes compensation
while ignoring the important competing interest in ensuring
pursual of legitimate objections to election misconduct.35
The Board also argued that because Labor Code section
1160.3 authorizes it to order make-whole relief when it
"deems such relief appropriate," the ALRA should be inter-
preted as granting the Board authority to impose make-whole
damages on the employer without first examining the facts
and equities of the particular case. The court rejected this ar-
gument, however, as unsupported by either the language or
the legislative history of the make-whole provision" and con-
cluded that a per se rule requiring make-whole relief when-
ever an employer ultimately does not prevail in its election
challenge is an impermissible abuse of the Board's discre-
tion. 7 Accordingly, the make-whole portion of the Board's or-
der was remanded for a determination of whether Norton
sought judicial review by refusing to bargain based on a rea-
sonable good faith belief that the alleged violations would
have affected the outcome of the election.
The court may have been too broad in its holding despite
its effort to narrow the Perry blanket rule by imposing the
make-whole remedy only in those cases where the employer's
conduct can be shown to be a clear and flagrant refusal to bar-
35. 26 Cal. 3d at 36, 603 P.2d at 1326, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
36. The Board's interpretation of § 1160.3 contravenes principles of statutory
construction by treating the words "when the Board deems such relief appropriate"
as surplusage, thus failing to accord them adequate significance, and because the
ALRB's interpretation of the provision is inconsistent with ALRA policy. Id. at 37,
603 P.2d at 1327, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
The hearings before the Senate committee reviewing the bill make it
clear that the language explicitly permitting the Board to order make-
whole relief was intended by the Legislature to resolve the question of
the Board's power to issue such an order, not to grant the Board unfet-
tered discretion to do so in all cases in which an employer ultimately
does not prevail in his election challenge.
Id. "[T]he provision authorizes the Board to award make-whole damages only when
the Board has determined that an employer refused to bargain and acted in bad
faith." Id. at 38, 603 P.2d at 1328, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (paraphrasing testimony of
then-Secretary of Agriculture and Services (now Chief Justice) Rose Elizabeth Bird
transcribed in Sen. Bill No. 1 Before Senate Industrial Relations Comm., Third Ex.
Sess. 1975 (May 21, 1975)).
37. 26 Cal. 3d at 39, 603 P.2d at 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
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gain for patently frivolous reasons. Even with this qualifica-
tion, the remedy may still be imposed at any stage where the
employer's refusal to bargain has met the court's standard, in-
cluding, as is the case here, where the employer has refused to
bargain in order to challenge an election certification decision.
As amicus curiae pointed out, this rule fails to take into
account that when the Board imposes make-whole relief on an
employer at this early stage, the parties have not bargained or
reached any type of agreement concerning wages and other
benefits. The Board, in such a situation, is to base its award of
damages on the rule set forth in Adam Dairy."s The make-
whole remedy as created by the Board in Adam Dairy, amicus
argued, imposes on the employer economic provisions of a
contract to which it was not a party, under what could have
been totally different economic circumstances. The employer
has no opportunity to assent to or to rebut the terms of the
remedy forced upon it by the Board. The Board, however, in
fashioning its make-whole remedy, has ignored the limitation
set forth in Labor Code section 1155.2(a) that it is without the
power to impose a contract on an employer.39
For these reasons, then, it appears that the remedy itself
may be valid, but its legality may be limited only to those
situations where an appropriate measure of damages exists. In
this respect, the remedy is invalid in the context of election
challenges because an appropriate measure of damages does
not exist. The language in Labor Code section 1160.3 that
grants the Board the power to order make-whole relief "when
it deems such relief appropriate" should, therefore, be con-
strued even more narrowly than the court has done here. The
remedy is "appropriate" only where an employer's conduct is
a clear and flagrant refusal to bargain and only where an ap-
38. 4 A.L.R.B. No. 24, at 18-29 (1978). In that case, the Board had calculated
the make-whole award by using an appropriate number of UFW contracts to deter-
mine the average negotiated wage rate for the relevant period. The Board determined
the value of fringe benefits from data collected by the Federal Bureau of Statistics.
39. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1155.2(a) (West Supp. 1980) provides in part:
[T]o bargain collectively in good faith is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the agricultural employer and the representative of the ag-
ricultural employees to... confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotia-
tion of an agreement .... but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
(emphasis added).
1981]
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propriate measure of damages exists.
The issue left unadressed by the court here appears sig-
nificant enough to ensure its resurfacing in later cases. Con-
tinued litigation, therefore, appears to be a certainty, at least
within this particular context.
Mary Lynne Thaxter
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-A PROVISION
NECESSARY TO THE OPERATION OF A SENIORITY
SYSTEM IS A COMPONENT OF THAT SYSTEM
AND THEREFORE EXEMPT FROM TITLE VII RE-
STRICTIONS, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY PERPETRATE
RESIDUAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION-California Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U.S.
598 (1980).
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 employ-
ers2 and unionss are prohibited from discriminating against
individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. An exception to the Title VII provisions set forth in
section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act, immunizes "bona fide"
seniority systems that are not the "result of an intention to
discriminate" even though they perpetrate pre-Title VII dis-
crimination.' The interpretation and application of this excep-
© 1981 by Margaret A. Murray
1. 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) makes it
unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
3. Id. § 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976) forbids a union:
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against, any individual because of his race ...
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify or fall or refuse to refer for em-
ployment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an individual in violation of this section.
4. Title VII became effective on July 2, 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 266 (1964).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) provides, in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not
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tion has engendered substantial judicial controversy.
In California Brewers Association v. Bryant,6 Abram
Bryant, a black brewery worker, filed a class action suit"
against the California Brewers Association, several brewing
companies and several unions. Bryant alleged that the state-
wide multiemployer collective-bargaining agreement8 (Agree-
ment) that governed the industrial relations between and
within the defendant organizations discriminated against him-
self and other black workers in violation of Title VII. Bryant
specifically challenged9 the seniority provision of the Agree-
ment that requires employees to work at least forty-five weeks
in one calendar year to progress from "temporary" to "perma-
nent" employee classification.10 Permanent status accorded
employees greater benefits1" and job security.12
Respondent contended that the 45-week requirement in
effect preserved an all white class of permanent workers and
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... ,
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to dis-
criminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
6. 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
7. When the action was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, it had not been certified as a class action pursuant to rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421,
424 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme Court did not comment on the
status of the class action other than to refer to the respondent and his "putative
class." 444 U.S. at 602.
8. The challenged agreement was negotiated on behalf of the breweries by the
petitioner, California Brewers Association, and on behalf of the worker's unions by
petitioner, Teamsters Brewery and Soft Drink Workers Joint Board. 444 U.S. at 602.
9. The complaint also alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) which pro-
vides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right. . . to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .," and, under 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 185
(1976), that the union defendants had breached their duty of fair representation by
bargaining for greater rights for some represented employees than others. Id. at 601.
10. The Agreement provides that a permanent employee is "any employee...
who.., has completed forty-five weeks of employment under this Agreement in one
classification in one calendar year as an employee of the brewing industry in [the
State of California]." Id. at 602 (footnote omitted).
11. Permanent employees receive preference over temporary employees with re-
spect to wages, vacation pay, choice of vacation times, and the right to collect supple-
mental unemployment benefits upon lay-off. Id. at 603 n.7.
12. The Agreement provides that lay-offs be effectuated in reverse order of
plant seniority, beginning with new employees, then temporary employees and finally,
permanent employees. Furthermore, once laid off the employees are hired back in the
reverse order from which they were laid off. Id. at 603.
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denied black workers the opportunity to achieve permanent
status."s Despite six years as a brewery worker, respondent
was still classified as a temporary employee. As defendants
and petitioners, California Brewer Association argued that the
seniority provision challenged by Bryant was a "bona fide" se-
niority system and therefore immune from prosecution under
section 703(h).
The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California concluded that the provisions and proce-
dures outlined in the Agreement were analogous to the "last-
hired, first-fired" formula permitted under Title VII14 and
therefore granted the California Brewers Association motion
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 5
The Ninth Circuit reversed the order, holding that the
45-week provision lacked the basic component of a seniority
system "that employment rights should increase with length
of employment."' The case was ordered remanded to the dis-
trict court to allow Bryant to prove "that the 45-week provi-
sion had a discriminatory impact on Black workers in viola-
tion of Title VII."117 Defendants then petitioned for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 8
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Stewart and
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehn-
quist,1 9 the United States Supreme Court vacated the Ninth
13. The Ninth Circuit observed that "no Black has ever attained permanent
employment status in a California brewery." Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585
F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1978).
14. See Watkins v. United States Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 43-44
(5th Cir. 1975), for an explanation of the "last-hired, first-fired" formula.
15. The dismissal was entered pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. No published opinion accompanied the dismissal. 444 U.S. at 604.
16. Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court made the further observation that:
The 45-week rule is simply a classification device to determine who en-
ters the permanent employee seniority line and this function does not
make the rule part of a seniority system. Otherwise any hiring policy
(e.g., an academic degree requirement) or classification device (e.g.,
merit promotion) would become part of a seniority system merely be-
cause it affects who enters the seniority line.
Id. at 427 n.11.
17. Id. at 428.
18. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in California Brewers Ass'n v.
Bryant, 442 U.S. 916 (1979).
19. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and
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Circuit ruling and remanded the action to the district court.'0
The Court held that requiring a "temporary" employee to
work at least forty-five weeks in one calendar year in order to
attain "permanent" status and to be accorded greater job se-
curity was a component of a seniority system and therefore
exempt from the provisions of Title VII.21
The scope and purpose of Title VII was first defined by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company." In
Griggs, a group of black employees challenged their em-
ployer's requirement of a high school diploma or the passing
of an intelligence test as a condition of employment or trans-
fer to a superior position in the company.2' Neither require-
ment was intended to measure the employee's ability to per-
form or learn a particular job.'
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, 5 re-
jected the defendant employer's contention that the tests used
were sanctioned by section 703(h) because they were not
"designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race
.... , In often cited language, the Supreme Court stated
that: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.' 7 The Court further
stated that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination
but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."'28
Blackmun joined. 444 U.S. at 611 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Powell and Ste-
vens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. The final decision,
then, was joined by only four Justices.
20. In the words of the Court-
In the District Court the respondent will remain free to show that, in
respect to the 45-week rule or in other respects, the seniority system
established by the Agreement is not "bona fide," or that the differences
in employment conditions that it has produced are "the result of an in-
tention to discriminate because of race."
Id. 610-11.
21. Id. at 610.
22. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Id. at 427-28.
24. Id. at 428.
25. Id. at 425. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
26. Id. at 433.
27. Id. at 430.
28. Id. at 431. The opinion, however, was not without restrictions. Chief Justice
[Vol. 21
1981] CALIFORNIA BREWERS v. BRYANT
Several lower courts have adopted the language of Griggs,
and, although the ruling was not directed at the propriety of
seniority systems per se, it has been used to fortify and sup-
port narrow applications of the seniority system exception to
Title VII.29 The reasoning, first stated in Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc.,s0 was that Congress could not have intended to
legalize seniority systems which in effect locked minorities
into inferior employment positions to which they had been
assigned as a result of discrimination. Consequently, section
703(h) was held not to protect systems that perpetrated pre-
act discrimination or which had their "genesis in racial
discrimination."31
Burger made clear that "Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee
a job to every person regardless of qualifications." Congress required only "the re-
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barri-
ers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification." Id. at 430-31.
29. See United States v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F.2d 582, 587-88 (4th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 659 (2nd Cir. 1971);
Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 987 (5th Cir. 1969)
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505,
516-18 (E.D. Va. 1968).
30. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
31. Id. at 517. In Quarles a minority employee sought to transfer to a different
position within the Philip Morris tobacco company. Such a change in position in-
volved the forfeiture of past seniority, future seniority being based solely on the
amount of time served in the new department. Quarles alleged that this de facto dis-
crimination deprived him of the opportunity to attain greater job security, higher
pay, and a better job because minorities were categorically assigned to lower positions
in the company when originally hired. Philip Morris claimed an exemption for the
system under section 703(h).
The court in Quarles examined the legislative history of the Act. During the Sen-
ate debate over H.R. 7152, which was to become the Civil Rights Act of 1964, concern
was expressed that major and costly changes would have to be made in the existing
seniority systems, and also that senior white workers would, as a result of the bill,
lose their jobs to minority workers. In answer to these objections, Senators Clark and
Case, the major proponents of the bill, submitted the following frequently cited
memorandum:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect
is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business
had been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white
working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation
would be simply to fill future vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis.
He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order
to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once
Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of
the white workers hired earlier.
Id. at 516 (quoting Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152, reprinted
in 110 CONG. Rac. 7213 (1964)) (emphasis added).
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Addressing the seniority system issue for the first time
the Supreme Court, in International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States,"' refused to accept the Quarles rule,
thereby overturning nearly ten years of judicial precedent.
Teamsters involved a fact pattern similar to that of Bryant.
In Teamsters, pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement
negotiated with defendant union, the employer maintained
parallel seniority ladders for different job classifications. A
transfer from one classification to another meant forfeiture of
past seniority, placing the transferee at the bottom of the se-
niority scale in the new position." As a result, seniority was
administered according to length of time served in a specific
position rather than length of time served in the company in
general.
The Supreme Court found that this system of seniority
disproportionately distributed benefits to the detriment of mi-
nority workers.3 4 However, the Court concluded that "both
the literal terms of section 703(h) and the legislative history of
Title VII demonstrate that Congress considered this very ef-
fect of many seniority systems and extended a measure of im-
munity to them." 5 The Court concluded that section 703(h)
was designed to protect vested seniority rights even when an
employer had initially discriminated in hiring. According to
Justice Stewart, a seniority system would violate Title VII
only if it were either 1) not "bona fide," or 2) if the difference
caused by the system were the result of an "intention to dis-
criminate,"3' 6 irrespective of the "locking-in" effect it may
The court in Quarles concluded that the mandate against retrospective applica-
tion of Title VII applied only to the practice of "bumping" white workers to provide
jobs for minorities. In contrast, granting minorities full company seniority for the
years they worked for the company was not retrospective application of Title VII.
Ruling in favor of plaintiff Quarles, the court stated that "[tihe plain language of the
act condemns as an unfair employment practice all racial discrimination affecting em-
ployment without excluding present discrimination that originated in seniority sys-
tems devised before the effective date of the act." Id. at 515.
32. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
33. Id. at 342-44. The company divided its workers into three classifications:
line driver, city driver, and serviceman. For various reasons positions as line drivers
were preferable over the other positions. Id. at 338 n.18. Furthermore, some long-
distance runs were more desireable than others. Line drivers most senior on the
"ladder" had first pick of these runs. Id. at 344 n.25.
34. Id. at 350.
35. Id. See note 31 supra for a discussion of the legislative history of section
703(h).
36. Id. at 353 n.38.
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have on minorities. Furthermore, the Court held that a pre-
act seniority system could be considered "bona fide" within
the meaning of section 703(h) even though it caused residual
discrimination or operated to "freeze" the status quo."
Justice Stewart addressed the apparent departure from
the language of the Griggs case, indicating that, "[w]ere it not
for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case would seem to
fall under the Griggs rationale."' 8 In so stating, Justice
Stewart limited the Griggs ruling to discriminatory employ-
ment practices such as intelligence tests and placed the issue
of seniority systems firmly outside its purview.
The probable effect of the Teamsters decision on the ef-
fort to eradicate employment discrimination has been the sub-
ject of lengthy commentary and speculation. 9 Supporters of
the Civil Rights Act expressed the hope that the Teamsters
case would be systematically distinguished and given only
half-hearted force in the lower courts.'0 In the aftermath of
Bryant, however, the perspective of the Supreme Court could
not be more clear. Title VII's exemption clause for bona fide
seniority systems has now been given a broad interpretation
in two major Supreme Court cases and the mandate can not
be ignored.
Since the term "seniority system" had not been defined
in either the wording of Title VII or its legislative history,
Justice Stewart began his opinion in Bryant with a discussion
of the concepts of seniority generally accepted by the indus-
trial sector. Conclusively defining the term "seniority system,"
he asserted that, "the principle feature of any and every 'se-
niority system' is that preferential treatment is dispensed on
the basis of some measure of time served in employment."' 1
Thus, although the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
came to adverse decisions, the definition of "seniority system"
employed by each was not fundamentally different. The diver-
gence in opinion occurred over how seniority time was to ac-
37. Id. The Court made this finding despite the government's argument that a
system which supports residual discrimination cannot be deemed "bona fide."
38. Id. at 349.
39. See, e.g., Waller, Teamsters and Seniority System Violations Under Title
VII: A Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 42 ALB. L. REv. 279 (1978); Carton,
The Seniority System Exemption in Title VII: International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 585 (1978).
40. See note 39 supra.
41. 444 U.S. at 606.
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crue for purposes of bestowing greater benefits and employ-
ment rights. While the Ninth Circuit concluded that rights
should accrue automatically and continually with length of
employment,4 2 the Supreme Court required only that the pas-
sage of time play some part in the seniority framework.48 Ac-
cordingly, since the Agreement challenged by Bryant did pro-
vide for increased seniority with the passage of time, albeit
not cumulatively, it conformed to the concept and definition
of "seniority system" accepted by the Supreme Court."
The Court emphasized that the Agreement was a product
of the collective-bargaining process vital to the governance of
industrial relations. Justice Stewart expressed strong concern
over judicial interference in the collective-bargaining process,
stating: "It does not behoove a court to second-guess either
that process or its products.' 4 5 The argument, simply stated,
is that workers, employers, and unions should be free to de-
velop conditions of employment and seniority systems which
are best suited to particular enterprises.
Justice Stewart likened the temporary and permanent
classifications used in the California brewing industry to the
line driver, serviceman, and city driver classifications main-
tained by the employer in the Teamsters case.4e Both systems
allocated benefits according to these classifications, thereby
operating parallel, but separate, seniority ladders. In language
reminiscent of the Teamsters decision, the Court state that
the fact that two or more seniority "tracks" were set up under
the collective-bargaining agreement "did not derogate from
the identification of the provisions as a 'seniority system'
under § 703(h).' '
The Supreme Court, relying on the same legislative his-
tory as the Ninth Circuit,4 determined that Congress "in-
tended to exempt from the normal operation of Title VII
more than simply those components of any particular senior-
ity scheme that, viewed in isolation, embody or effectuate the
42. Bryant v. California Brewers Asa'n, 585 F.2d 421, 427 (1978).
43. 444 U.S. at 606.
44. Under the Agreement, a temporary worker's accrued seniority (and his or
her chance of becoming a permanent employee) terminated at the end of each year,
unless he or she had worked at least 45 weeks in that year. Id. at 608.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 609.
47. Id.
48. See note 31 supra.
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principle that length of employment will be rewarded."' '9 The
Court thus went beyond the reasoning in the Teamsters case,
and shifted the focus of section 703(h) from the propriety of
particular seniority provisions to the seniority system "as a
whole."' 50 Viewed in that sense, rules which are ancillary to the
seniority system and which "accomplish certain necessary
functions, but which may not themselves be directly related to
length of employment" are protected under section 703(h)."
As examples of those types of provisions which can be
termed as "ancillary" to a seniority system, the Court cited
rules which establish when and by what actions an employee
forfeits accrued seniority, and rules which indicate when the
accrual of seniority begins.'2 The forty-five week provision in
the Bryant collective-bargaining agreement was classified by
the Court as just such an ancillary rule because it "serves the
needed function of establishing the threshold requirement for
entry into the permanent employee seniority track."58
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, Justice Marshall approved the reasoning and hold-
ing of the Ninth Circuit." He contended that to qualify as a
seniority system under the definition accepted by the Court,
employment provisions should award seniority on the basis of
total length of employment "not length of service within a cal-
endar year.' 55 He thereby rejected the Court's conclusion that
parallel seniority tracks are permissible and qualify as senior-
ity systems within the meaning of section 703(h), as long as an
employee is able to advance in status in a specific job classifi-
cation and seniority ladder, in accordance with some measure
of time.6 "The mere fact that the 45-week rule is in some
sense a measure of time does not demonstrate a valid relation
to concepts of seniority.' 7
Justice Marshall noted that because the brewing industry
is a seasonal one the attainment of seniority by fulfilling the
45-week requirement is a fortuitous circumstance beyond the
49. 444 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 606.
51. Id. at 607.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 609.
54. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
55. 444 U.S. at 616-17 (Marshall J., dissenting).
56. Id. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
57. 444 U.S. at 617 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19811
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
control of the individual employee.58 This characteristic of the
industry made the 45-week rule a "virtually impassable bar-
rier to advancement" 5' from temporary to permanent status.
In Justice Marshall's opinion, the uncertainty and unfairness
fostered by the rule indicated that it "has very little to do
with seniority .... "60
Justice Marshall's most significant criticism of the major-
ity opinion is that it departs from basic statutory interpreta-
tion principles. He maintained that exemptions to remedial
measures should be construed narrowly to avoid undermining
the spirit and practical effects of the curative legislation. Ac-
cording to Marshall, to do otherwise is an abuse of the inter-
pretive process. e
In effect, the Supreme Court in Bryant broadened the
scope of section 703(h), if not in terms of original Congres-
sional intent, then certainly in terms of prior interpretative
law. Seniority systems which are "bona fide" and devoid of
intentional discrimination, and now those rules which support
and are "necessary" to the operation of these systems, are all
exempt from Title VII prosecution. The Court has not, how-
ever, indicated what facts a plaintiff must establish in future
litigation to prove that a seniority system is not "bona fide"
and therefore not entitled to protection under section 703(h).
How this question will be resolved, and whether the Bryant
58. Id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 615-16 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit also empha-
sized this point, stating that:
The rub is that changed circumstances in the brewery industry, includ-
ing greater automation, improved brewing methods, and consolidation of
breweries, have lessened the demand for labor, so that now it is virtually
impossible for any temporary employee, Black or White, to work 45
weeks in one calendar year.
Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421, 424 (1978). The Supreme Court
addressed the same issue in a footnote, stating that:
There are indications in the record of this case that a long-term decline
in the California brewing industry's demand for labor is a reason why
the accrual of seniority as a temporary employee has not led more auto-
matically to the acquisition of permanent status. But surely, what would
be part of a "seniority system" in an expanding labor market does not
become something else in a declining labor market.
444 U.S. at 610 n.22.
60. 444 U.S. at 616 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 618 (citing Phillip Co. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)).
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opinion has vitiated the effect of Title VII on discriminatory
employment practices, remains to be seen.
Margaret A. Murray

